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Reforming the Local Welfare State in Denmark:
The Geographical Paradox of Amalgamating 
Municipalities
 Ulrik Kjaer※
Abstract
In 2007 the Danish municipal structure was changed, and the number of 
political/administrative units forming the local welfare state was reduced from 
271 to 98. In the debate leading up to the reform, several arguments on municipal 
amalgamations, pro et contra, were deliberated. The article identifies the 
different arguments and assesses that professional sustainability was the key 
argument for larger municipalities, whereas the increased citizen per councilor 
ratio was the key argument against. It claims that the reform unleashed a 
struggle for economic resources among different geographical parts of the newly 
amalgamated municipalities and that the outcome of this redistributive game is 
important for the professionalization of the provision of local welfare services. It 
is too early to evaluate the consequences of the reform, but the article argues 
assessments of such reforms must include the potential consequences for the 
geographical distribution of welfare provision and of economic growth and 
development in more general terms.
Key Words:  local welfare state, municipal amalgamations, professionalization, 
Denmark
1. INTRODUCTION – REFORMING THE LOCAL WELFARE STATE
In normal parlance the term “welfare state” is most often used in connection 
with public provision of services such as child care, primary and secondary 
schooling, social service, care for the elderly etc. However, in quite a lot of 
countries these policy areas are not exclusively handled by the state, as literally 
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implied by the wording welfare state, but in collaboration between the central 
state level and the decentralized local level (municipal and/or provincial). In some 
countries the municipalities are actually the primary provider of welfare services 
such as schooling and social care. Even though central legislation often regulates 
the level of service to be provided (e.g. minimum standards), some of the specifics 
concerning the provision (e.g. school curriculums) and whom among the citizens 
should receive the service (e.g. non-discrimination rules), the municipalities 
provide the services. The councilors not only make a lot of the decisions 
concerning organization and delivery of welfare state services; they are to a large 
extent held accountable at the next local elections if the citizens are not satisfied 
with the specific welfare services they receive.
It would be going too far to suggest that the term “welfare state” is replaced 
by the term “welfare municipality” or “welfare state/municipality” but the above 
mentioned local element of welfare state services should at least lead to an 
acknowledgment of the existence of a “local welfare state”. This is especially true 
in countries where the welfare state is most “localized”, such as the Scandinavian 
countries where welfare service provided by the local level accounts for more than 
one fifth of the GNP (Mouritzen, 2003, p. 32). The extent to which the local level is 
included in welfare service production varies, but it is safe to say that the 
expansion of the welfare state during the past fifty years has been based on the 
parallel growth in the political/administrative organizations at the local political 
level, i.e. municipalities and counties. As Blom-Hansen writes: “Today the 
Scandinavian welfare state is basically a local welfare state” (Blom-Hansen, 2010, 
p. 52).
Recognition of the local level as the backbone of the welfare state in regard to 
welfare service provision is also important in respect to raising awareness of the 
trends and recent reforms at the local level. Since local governments are trusted 
with large parts of the welfare state, changes and reforms at the local government 
level can potentially impact the realization of welfare state policy. According to 
Kjellberg: “Local government reorganization is endemic to the development of the 
Welfare State” (Kjellberg, 1985, p. 236). And in many countries – including in 
Scandinavia – things are indeed changing. It is not that reforming local 
governments is the latest new thing – on the contrary local governments are 
probably constantly reforming and thereby transforming themselves. However, 
since “[t]he expansion of the public sector and its mounting complexity involved 
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an increasing pressure on the existing institutional arrangements at the local and 
regional level” (Kjellberg, 1985, p. 236), a number of countries have recently 
implemented quite ambitious reforms (Moisio, 2012).
For quite some time reforming local governments has meant including 
market-based initiatives, building political regimes involving a range of non-
governmental players, creating governing networks, changing the form of 
government, introducing facilitative leadership, starting governing by objectives 
etc. (Stone, 1989; Berg & Rao, 2005; Svara, 1990). Some of these trends are part of 
the more general change within public administration labeled New Public 
Management (Hood, 1991) and all have been included under the general heading 
of governance (e.g. John, 2001). The trend in local governments has for years been 
a change from government to governance. However, in recent years the pendulum 
has swung back and in many countries (not least in Europe) the hot issue is now 
amalgamations, which is more government than governance (Kjaer, 2011). After 
several decades with governance as the buzzword it seems that something as old 
fashioned as “structural reforms” (which “concern territorial division and 
organization” and include “the redrawing of boundaries and the amalgamation of 
municipalities” (Kjellberg, 1985, p. 219)) has returned as the most favored 
potential solution to modernizing and tuning the local welfare state.
In the discussion of how to design a local governmental system the question 
of size is – and has continuously been – one of the classic dimensions of analysis. 
This is no mystery, because once you decide to establish (or retain) a local level in 
a country it follows that the country must be divided into a number of 
geographically defined units. However, it is not obvious how many units. The basic 
raison d’être of local governments is that they offer a number of units larger than 
one – it is the sheer number of municipalities that opens up for the traditional 
decentralization arguments (and counterarguments). Since the local element of 
the welfare state is grounded on these arguments for decentralization – and since 
the question of size has these arguments as point of origin – they should be briefly 
summarized:
First, the argument of subsidiarity, which is a very normative claim that 
decisions are best taken by those who are closest to its consequences. Since liberty 
(from the state) is best nourished in smaller local settings, political power should 
be decentralized. This traditional localist argument has also evolved into a 
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general preference for the local: “A metaphysical pathos for local autonomy – a 
moral empathy for the idea that what is local is good and what is central is bad” 
(Page, 1982, p. 39). Second, the span of control argument, which claims that the 
state itself prefers to include local governments since the state has neither the 
capacity nor the ambition to go into each and every detail of the complex societal 
machinery: “[N]o national government wants to cope with everything” (Sharpe, 
1970, p. 154). In the more sophisticated version the state needs the local 
governments as a unified service-providing agency at the local level to perform 
horizontal coordination of state level initiatives in different policy areas (Sharpe, 
1970, p. 167). Third, a genius of place argument for decentralization (Laski quoted 
in Sharpe, 1970, p. 155) can be identified. Not only can the central state 
experience difficulties coping with the amount of decisions to be taken; it can also 
be difficult for the state to see through all local specifics and have local knowledge 
of the local context (history, topography, culture etc.) which can be advantageous 
in the decision making process: “[C]entral government is not equipped to grasp 
the inimitable conditions of each locality” (Sharpe, 1970, p. 155). Fourth, the 
argument of efficiency claims that if a wider variety of welfare services are 
provided (which is possible when more local units act as providers) a better match 
with (more) citizens’ preferences is obtained. This welfare economic argument is 
stronger if the mobility among citizens is high (so that the citizens can “vote with 
their feet” in a Tieboutian jargon (Tiebout, 1956)). In that case, the “local 
authorities … will compete with each other in the services they provide and so 
raise the quality and effectiveness of these services” (Sharpe, 1970, p. 158). Fifth, 
building on this competition among the local units, an innovation argument of 
decentralization can be identified. In their eagerness to attract citizens (and 
corporations) by offering better service than the neighbouring municipality, the 
municipalities will be more focused on improving their service and experiment 
and innovate more (Treisman, 2007, p. 14). Since local governments do not take 
out patents on new ways of providing welfare service, successful innovation can 
spread to other municipalities and an innovation/diffusion process can be created 
where good ideas flow. Sixth, there is also a school of democracy argument of 
decentralization. Local governments require local councilors and this “provides 
broad opportunities for citizens to participate in public policy” (Sharpe, 1970, p. 
155). Several citizens are given the chance to participate in politics on this lower 
level and therefore local governments provide “political education” (Mill quoted in 
Pratchett, 2004, p. 360). In Tocqueville’s solemn words: “Local institutions are to 
liberty what primary schools are to science; they put it within people’s reach; they 
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teach people to appreciate its peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to make use 
of it” (quoted in Sharpe, 1970, p. 161). And finally, seventh, a diffusion of power 
argument can be used in favor of decentralization. From the school of democracy 
argument follows that more people are involved in the policy making processes, 
which means a potential for more power sharing (Treisman, 2007, p. 13). This also 
leads back to the argument of subsidiarity and not least to the conclusion that the 
seven arguments of decentralization are often quite intertwined.
There is a flipside to decentralization, and there are also arguments against 
decentralization. Decentralization can make macroeconomic policy more difficult, 
coordination between local governments can be troublesome, norms of equality 
can be violated, genius of place might also mean narrowminded etc. The 
counterarguments will be discussed in more detail in the next part of the article 
which focuses on the question of size of the municipal units in the local welfare 
state. This is a hotly debated issue at the moment and since the local level of the 
welfare state is indeed important for the understanding of the welfare state, the 
ongoing discussion of structural reforms of local governments is an important 
feature of the more general discussion of reforming the welfare state. As already 
pointed out, the question of size is neither trivial nor easy to answer, especially 
since the arguments can vary in presence and strength across time and space. The 
remainder of the discussion is therefore based on a specific case study.
We have chosen Denmark as a case, since it is one of the most localized 
welfare states and because the municipal structure recently – in 2007 – changed 
dramatically when 271 municipalities were reduced to 98 (Bundgaard & 
Vrangbæk, 2007; Andersen, 2008; Houlberg, 2010; Mouritzen, 2010; Blom-Hansen, 
2010, 2012). We do not intend to evaluate the structural reform since it is 
probably too early to assess the full consequences (just as the economic crisis 
starting with the 2008 financial crash makes it difficult to isolate the 
consequences of the reform from the consequences of the other substantial 
changes in society). But in part 2 we will discuss the arguments that were used in 
the debate leading up to the structural reform. It will be argued that the 
geographical or spatial elements of the reform were somewhat overlooked. A lot of 
the debate focused on which municipalities should amalgamate, so geography was 
not absent from the discussions, but some of the important geographically based 
arguments for and against amalgamating municipalities were not always 
included in the public debate before the decision to amalgamate was made. In 
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part 3 we will therefore discuss geography and the tensions between different 
localities in contemporary politics. Part 4 sums up the lessons from the Danish 
case; it has been claimed that the structural reform “establishes new rules and a 
new course for the future development of the Danish welfare state” (Bundgaard & 
Vrangbæk, 2007, p. 491).
2.  THE ARGUMENTS ON AMALGAMATING MUNICIPALITIES – 
PRO ET CONTRA
During the silly season of summer 2002 a discussion of municipal 
amalgamations started in Denmark. At the outset it was also a discussion of 
several dimensions of the local government structure, for instance whether to 
remove the regional government level (and only keep the municipal level) and 
whether to move responsibility for certain tasks from one political level to 
another. Some of these questions – including size of municipalities – are 
intertwined. Some tasks can be moved from the central government to the 
municipalities only if the municipalities have a certain size; the regional level is 
somewhat redundant if there are only very few (and very large) municipalities 
etc. Even though the question of the number of tiers in the Danish government 
structure was probably the most debated dimension in Denmark in the 1980s (the 
governing Conservative party argued for a two-tier system with abolishment of 
the regional level) and even though the question of which tasks each tier would 
handle was the most discussed in the 1990s (leading to a white paper on the 
matter (Opgavekomissionen, 1998)), the question of municipal size dominated the 
debate initiated in 2002.
Right after the issue was introduced in the public debate, the government 
appointed a working commission to produce a white paper on the local 
government structure. The white paper was published in January 2004 
(Strukturkommissionen, 2004) and after some negotiations a parliamentary 
decision was taken in June 2004 to reform the structure of the governmental 
system (for an analysis of the decision making process see Bundgaard & 
Vrangbæk, 2007; Christiansen & Klitgaard, 2010). The regional level was 
maintained (although the number of regions was reduced from 14 to 5), a few 
tasks were moved from one level to another (tax collection from municipality to 
state; employment policy from state to municipality; advanced social service, 
special education and environmental protection from regions to municipalities), 
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and the number of municipalities was reduced from 271 to 98 (for a timeline see 
Bundgaard & Vrangbæk, 2007, p. 496).
As a consequense of the reform and the amalgamation of municipalities the 
average size of Danish municipalities rose from 19,900 to 55,200 inhabitants 
(Blom-Hansen, 2010, p. 54). But what were the arguments for and against 
amalgamating municipalities? By and large the discussion was formed around the 
very traditional opposition between efficiency and democracy (or what Newton 
denotes functional effectiveness and democracy (1982)). From the outset the 
discussion of these two dimensions followed the traditional lines, i.e., 
amalgamating municipalities is seen to improve efficiency and hurt democracy. In 
Dearlove’s words: “Small is to democracy as large is to efficiency” (Dearlove, 1979, 
p. 60). This is the standard view, but in a seminal article Newton has questioned 
this simple correlation: “Is small really so beautiful? Is big really so ugly?” 
(Newton, 1982). Also in the Danish debate were the efficiency and the democracy 
arguments challenged, bringing a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between these dimensions and municipal size into the discussion. 
Equally important, the efficiency as well as the democracy argument was 
elaborated and specified in more detail in the debate and at least four more 
detailed dimensions of each argument could be identified. We will briefly 
introduce the eight arguments, including their counterarguments.
2-1. Matching preferences
As already stated, one of the main arguments for decentralization – and for 
the existence of a local government tier altogether – is that more units providing 
welfare services such as child care, primary schools, care for the elderly etc. allow 
for variation in the services. Since the citizens probably have different preferences 
it would be possible, ceteris paribus, to match these preferences better. However, 
the argument goes, establishing a local government tier does not in itself ensure 
that this preference matching mechanism functions – if the municipalities are 
very small they will probably not be entrusted with the responsibility of 
important welfare state tasks. Or if they are, such decentralized tasks would 
probably be accompanied by so many minimum standards, national legislation on 
specific procedures and control measures that the discretion of the local 
governments (and thereby the possibility to match local preferences) is 
correspondingly negligible. Therefore, a necessary prerequisite for exploiting the 
preference matching potential of local governments is that they have a size that 
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makes them so robust and potent in economic and professional terms that they 
can be entrusted with the increasingly complex tasks of the modern welfare state. 
In the debate it was claimed that the state was regulating small municipalities 
more and more and that amalgamations were needed to loosen the central 
government’s grip on the municipalities. The counterargument here is that 
amalgamating municipalities will reduce the number of units at the local level 
and thereby the number of potentially different local solutions – and in more 
general terms different service/tax combinations. This consequence was discussed 
considerably; not so much in terms of the reduction of potentially different local 
service provisions but much more down to earth in regard to the immediate 
harmonization of the local welfare services in each of the amalgamated 
municipalities. Since Danish municipalities are not allowed to discriminate based 
on geography, amalgamating municipalities will lead to a harmonization of the 
level of service provided to the citizens. If a number of municipalities are 
amalgamated they have to give up their different ways of providing for instance 
care for the elderly and settle on a common level of service and a common policy 
on how this service is provided. If before the amalgamation one municipality tries 
to keep the elderly in their own home as long as possible (nursing assistants, 
physiotherapists, social assistants etc. come to the elderly’s home) while another 
makes the elderly move into nursing homes, they have to harmonize and settle on 
a common policy. The level of service provided should also be harmonized in terms 
of budget. So in the short run the variation in the welfare service provided seems 
to be smaller due to the immediate service harmonization within each 
amalgamation. In the long run amalgamated municipalities might be entrusted 
with more tasks and not least more discretion in deciding how the service should 
be provided, expanding the policy areas for the preference matching mechanism 
to function. This could be labeled the efficiency dilemma. But let us turn to some 
of the intermediate mechanisms in the discussion of efficiency.
2-2. Economies of scale
One of the most simple and straightforward arguments in favor of 
amalgamating municipalities in the Danish debate as well in the academic 
literature is based on economies of scale. In the private sector the standard 
argument for larger companies and larger production facilities is economies of 
scale – the more units produced, the lower the average cost. This argument is not 
only the reason for merging companies but also for amalgamating municipalities 
– the more welfare service produced, the lower the cost per unit produced 
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(Newton, 1982). However, the opposing argument, that there is a limit to 
economies of scale, was also been used in the debate. In other words, if municipal 
size is taken beyond this limit, diseconomies of scale will kick in. According to the 
classic diseconomies of scale argument, larger municipalities will lead to 
“bureaucratic expense and wastefulness” (Newton, 1982, p. 194) but in Denmark 
the counter to the economies of scale was more developed. First of all it was 
claimed that larger municipalities would lead to more middle management – a 
larger organization requires more coordination and bureaucracy. Secondly, it was 
argued that larger bureaucracies base their operation on relatively more written 
than oral communication and caseworkers in larger municipalities would spend 
more of their time writing to each other. Finally, it was questioned if economies of 
scale would really work in welfare services such as child care and primary schools 
since the unit of production in many cases is not the municipality, but institutions 
like schools and day care centers. As long as these are not merged, economies of 
scale cannot be obtained.
2-3. Professional sustainability
Newton has said that “[A]s urban-industrial society becomes larger and more 
complex, so must local government” (Newton, 1982, p. 195). The argument goes 
that welfare service provision has become an increasingly complex business – not 
only have the professional dimensions of many welfare services multiplied, so 
have the legislators’ policy ambitions. This is all reflected in more and more 
detailed legislation and in the demand among legislators and citizens alike that 
local governments handle these often quite wicked problems professionally. Here 
the argument goes that small municipalities do not have the capacity to meet the 
demands for professionalization. As Newton explains: “[I]t has been found that 
quite a large population is necessary for some rather specialized services such as 
residential children ’s homes, special educational institutions, temporary 
accommodation for the aged, and facilities for the physically and mentally 
handicapped” (Newton, 1982, p. 195). In the Danish debate it was repeatedly 
mentioned that small municipalities were not professionally sustainable – they 
did not reach the critical mass of citizens required to handle the more specialized 
tasks professionally. The argument was that for instance case workers in social 
services could not specialize sufficiently to the required level of education to stay 
updated on the relevant legislation. In small municipalities each case worker has 
to deal with several different types of cases, which leaves less opportunity to 
develop specialized skills within a field. A widely discussed example in the Danish 
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debate originated from the white paper and described how case workers dealing 
with forcible removal of children from dysfunctional families (with drug addiction, 
violence or sexual abuse) only encountered this type of case once a year 
(Strukturkommissionen, 2004). It is of course fortunate that the municipalities 
seldom have to intervene in such tragic family events, but it is less fortunate that 
when such cases arise in small municipalities the social worker is not prepared. 
By amalgamating municipalities these cases can be concentrated on fewer case 
workers who then get the possibility to specialize and gain more experience and 
better skills in dealing with these cases. If several municipalities are 
amalgamated into one it might even be possible to concentrate these cases in so 
few administrations that more than one case worker works with them full time in 
the same amalgamated municipality. A milieu for professional discussions might 
be established and the administration becomes more robust – if one case worker 
is sick or on sabbatical leave, another can take over. It was often mentioned that 
creating professional milieus could have a self-reinforcing effect. The better case 
workers within a field would be attracted by the opportunity to cooperate and 
discuss with well qualified colleagues and larger municipalities would have the 
upper hand in the game of attracting the best qualified employees. Not everybody 
bought into the argument on professional sustainability, though. Not only was the 
argument that people working at city hall should have a better professional 
milieu hard to sell to ordinary citizens, who feared that the money spent on hiring 
another person with a law degree to work in the administration would be taken 
from for instance nurse assistants in the elderly care. Another counterargument 
was that municipal caseworkers could be too professional and overspecialized. 
Some citizens value having only one case worker, who is not be a specialist on 
everything, but a “specialist” on this specific citizen and be able to take all 
relevant information into consideration.
2-4. Reform effect
It was often argued – though not very openly – in the debate that 
amalgamation could in itself be a useful tool in service checking the municipal 
organization. An amalgamation is such a major restructuring and opens a window 
of opportunity to get rid of inefficient procedures and habits. The process of 
designing a new amalgamated municipality can be an opportunity to alter 
procedures that have so far been hard to change due to organizational inertia. On 
the other hand, a much more outspoken concern in the debate was that the 
reform in itself would constitute a source of inefficiency while pending. The 
43
Reforming the Local Welfare State in Denmark
argument was that amalgamating municipalities involves a number of sunk costs 
ranging from the very obvious like moving expenses when administrative 
organizations are relocated geographically and development of a new common 
design line to more hidden costs like man power and organizational costs involved 
in planning and implementation. Also the more sophisticated version that 
amalgamating municipalities have an incentive to overspend in the last 
budgetary year before the amalgamation (the common pool problem – see Blom-
Hansen, 2010) was mentioned as an argument against amalgamations.
2-5. Citizen inclusion
Arguments regarding democracy were also in the Danish case primarily used 
against amalgamations – the main argument in favor of status quo being that 
local democracy would suffer in larger municipalities. In its broadest and most 
general formulation the argument was that the citizens would be included less in 
the political decision making process if the municipalities became larger. The idea 
of small political communities where all citizens participate in political meetings 
was abandoned a long time ago – also at the local government level. 
Representative democracy has prevailed and dominates modern thinking on local 
democracy in Denmark. However, even in representative democratic settings size 
seems to matter, and it was repeatedly mentioned in the debate that the inclusion 
of ordinary citizens in local politics would suffer if municipalities were 
amalgamated. This is in line with Dahl and Tufte’s argument in their seminal 
book Size and democracy (1973): “Smaller democracies provide more opportunity 
for citizens to participate effectively in decisions” (Dahl & Tufte, 1973, p. 12). 
Larger municipalities were often seen as enemies of democracy in the Danish 
debate; however, the argument was not that large municipalities were 
undemocratic, “only” that conditions for the local edition of representative 
democracy were not as good as in smaller municipal i t ies. Another 
counterargument went that the supposedly better inclusion of citizens in small 
municipalities matters less if these municipalities are not left with important 
political decisions. The citizens may be more involved in the political process in 
small municipalities, but this is not an advantage if the smallness of the 
municipality leads the central government to centralize most political decisions. 
This argument was well in line with the important amendment that Dahl and 
Tufte included in their take on size and democracy quoted above: “But: Larger 
democracies provide opportunities for citizens to participate, at least by voting in 
elections, in the decisions of a political system large enough to control all or most 
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of the major aspects of their situation that can be controlled” (Dahl & Tufte, 1973, 
p. 13). This is the democracy dilemma in discussions about municipal 
amalgamations.
2-6. Participation
One of the more detailed arguments on citizen inclusion in the Danish debate 
was that citizens would participate less in local politics in the larger than in the 
smaller municipalities. The claim was that the main motivation for participating 
in local political discussions is that your voice is heard and they concern matters 
related to the locality where you live. Both motivations for participating are 
supposed to be affected negatively when municipalities are amalgamated. With 
more people living in the municipality your voice and/or vote count less than 
before and some of the political discussions in your municipality now concern 
mostly communities at some distance from where you live. The motivation for 
each citizen to participate in the political process – either by voting or by 
discussing with friends and neighbours – was, therefore, claimed to be lower in 
larger than in smaller municipalities. The counterargument said that organized 
political participation could actually increase after amalgamation. For instance, 
political parties would benefit from amalgamations as citizens would have more 
opportunities to participate in organized political activity. In many small 
municipalities only a few of the largest of the many Danish parties had a critical 
mass of supporters to form a local branch and many voters who lived there could 
not participate in local party activities. Amalgamation would mean enough 
supporters also of the smaller parties to establish a branch in most municipalities 
(see also Newton, 1982, p. 200).
2-7. Genius of place
As mentioned in the introduction one of the main arguments for 
decentralization is “genius of place” – that decision making processes taking place 
in close proximity to the specific problems will be more informed on the local 
specifics and therefore result in better decisions. In the Danish debate opponents 
of amalgamations repeatedly argued that increasing the size of the municipalities 
would also increase the “distance” between politicians and citizens. The chance of 
knowing a local politician personally would decrease, whether knowing means 
being related, living in the same street, having kids at the same school, playing 
soccer in the same club or doing the grocery shopping in the same shops. Of 
course, local democracy in its representative version does not necessarily imply a 
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thorough and continuous consultation between politicians and citizens between 
elections, or that such consultation should happen because they bump into each 
other at the local shopping mall or because some citizens have privileged access to 
certain councilors. However, the genius of place argument also builds on 
information flow, and fewer councilors in fewer municipalities were seen as a very 
serious problem in the debate. Some saw fewer councilors with less direct contact 
to individual citizens as advantageous to local democracy, and they counter-
argued that in very small municipalities the councilors were sometimes too close 
to the citizens or at least to some groups. It can be difficult for the councilors to 
make unpopular decisions if they know they will meet the unhappy citizens next 
morning at the bakery or at the day care center. During the past years many 
municipalities have discussed changing the structure of the schools and closing a 
school in one part of the municipality often leads to massive critique of the 
councilors by the citizens living there. If councilors are close to these citizens it 
can be very difficult to close a school even if a decrease in the number of children 
suggests so. In larger municipalities, the argument went, the distance between 
politicians and citizens would make room for political professionalization.
2-8. Accountability
An argument against amalgamations was that larger municipalities would 
make the political/administrative systems less transparent and more difficult for 
citizens to gain insight in the local decision making process. This would again 
restrain the possibilities of holding the politicians accountable for their decisions 
at the next election – a cornerstone in representative democracy (Beetham, 1996). 
The larger and more professionalized municipalities makes it harder for the not 
so professionalized citizens to follow local politics and not least to decide whether 
to re-elect the incumbents. The counterargument was that small municipalities do 
not prevent closed political processes; actually professionalization of the 
bureaucracy could be a measure to identify political wrong doing.
2-9. The relative importance of the arguments
The arguments from the Danish debate described here are included in Figure 
1. Asterisks mark which arguments are assessed to have played the most 
important and decisive role. Among the arguments against amalgamations, 
genius of place was by far the most frequent. It really raised a serious concern in 
most debates. Also the costs of reforming were a major concern among many local 
politicians and citizens alike. The two main arguments in favor of amalgamations 
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were economies of scale and professional sustainability. Economies of scale is 
usually the top argument for amalgamating, but it only came in second in the 
Danish debate, where the professional sustainability argument was very strong. 
The very short version of why the Danish municipalities were amalgamated in 
2007 would actually be that it was done out of concern for the professional 
sustainability in the small municipalities.
FIGURE 1  Arguments for and against amalgamating municipalities mentioned in the 
Danish debate leading up to the 2007 Structural reform
Arguments on amalgamating municipalities
Pro Contra
Efficiency
Matching 
preferences
The mechanism will be expanded 
since more tasks and more local 
discretion can be entrusted larger 
municipalities 
Fewer potentially different  
service/tax combinations 
Economies 
of scale
Scale effects* No scale effects when the unit of 
production is institutions and 
diseconomies of scale caused by 
need for middle management and 
written communication
Professional 
sustainability
Specialization and professional 
milieu leading to more professional 
casework ***
Overprofessionalization and 
overspecialization 
Reform 
effect
Opens window of opportunity to 
reorganize
Costs of reforming *
Democracy
Citizen 
inclusion 
System capacity makes local 
democracy more important
Citizen effectiveness suffer
Participation Organized participation will 
increase
Individual participation will 
decrease
Genius of 
place
Political professionalization Loss of information due to larger 
distance between politician and 
citizens **
Accountability More professionalized and therefore 
more transparent 
Larger and therefore less transparent
*** Extremely important argument in the Danish debate
** Very important argument in the Danish debate
* Quite important argument in the Danish debate
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Note that even though most of the arguments are known from the literature, 
they are still mostly empirically unsettled. As Newton summarize the studies of 
efficiency: “[W]e can conclude with confidence that, under certain not well 
understood circumstances, it may, or may not, be more, or less, economical to have 
larger, or smaller, local authorities” (Newton, 1982, p. 193). In regard to 
democracy, Dahl and Tufte’s claim that “no single type or size of unit is optimal” 
(Dahl & Tufte, 1973, p. 138) still has not been seriously challenged.
3. GEOGRAPHY MATTERS – ALSO IN THE LOCAL WELFARE STATE
One important lesson from the Danish case and from the debate leading to 
the structural reform of the local welfare state is that spatial arguments tended 
to play a far larger role than expected. For quite some time the general perception 
has been that place has lost significance – that different aspects of social life, 
including politics, have been deterritorialized (Appadurai, 1996; Tomlinson, 1999). 
Or at its most extreme: “Geography has become irrelevant” (Coupland, 2010, p. 9). 
Even though other scholars have claimed that the process of deterritorialization 
is not necessarily going that fast (Ghemawat, 2011), geography is no longer 
among the usual suspects when political discussions are analyzed and political 
cleavages are identified. Discussing municipal amalgamation by contrasting 
efficiency and democracy could have meant weighing the advantages of economies 
of scale against the disadvantages of less citizen participation in local politics. But 
as illustrated in Figure 1 the two leading arguments were professional 
sustainability (pro) and the larger distance between politicians and voters 
(contra), and they certainly have a spatial element to them.
As for professional sustainability, the argument for larger municipalities not 
only goes on creating a larger citizen base (and thereby facilitate specialization) 
but also on creating a better and more professional milieu for the employees. This 
is done by concentrating employees in fewer units – ultimately at one larger City 
Hall in the new amalgamated municipality – thereby taking advantage of the 
general power of agglomeration (Glaeser, 2011; Moretti, 2012). As for the larger 
distance between politicians and citizens, the spatial dimension is quite obvious; 
with a lower politician/citizen ratio there will, ceteris paribus, be less direct 
contact between the two groups and the voice of the more peripheral localities in 
the new amalgamated municipality will probably be lower at the new City Hall.
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So the discussion of amalgamations in Denmark also touched upon the 
potential geographical consequences. Obtaining professional sustainability by 
concentrating the administration of the local welfare state in the center of the 
new amalgamated municipalities also means changing the patterns of the future 
economic development within them. Not that the municipal jobs are the only 
ingredient in determining mechanisms of growth but there would probably be a 
substantial spill-over effect from concentrating the local welfare state jobs in the 
center of the new municipality. In the Danish case the discussion of 
amalgamations therefore in many ways unleashed a more traditional 
redistributive game between geographical entities, in this case played out 
between what would become the center and the periphery, repectively, of the new 
amalgamated municipalities.
Such redistributive games where citizens and politicians from different 
geographical areas fight for economic growth and wealth are well known on the 
global and the national scenes, and most observers would probably agree that it 
has not been less intense in recent years – on the contrary. At the global level, for 
instance, North America, the EU and the strong Asian economies fight against 
each other in the global market place and in the game about future wealth and 
prosperity. In that case the fight is organized around geographic location, but 
sometimes the “teams” are made up of countries that are not geographically close, 
for instance traditional advanced economies (such as Denmark and Japan) 
against BRIC countries (such as Brazil and China). The redistributive game can 
also been fought between countries of the same type, for instance when Japan and 
Denmark fight for market shares in the same market. The same three patterns 
are found at the national level. In Denmark, there is an intense fight for 
investments between the capital of Copenhagen and the rest of the country, and 
among the large cities and the smaller cities/rural areas. Finally, there is a fight 
for tomorrow’s growth between for instance the smaller cities – if a private 
company is relocating or a public institution has to be placed somewhere they all 
argue that their city would be the best locality.
The debate about the municipal structure in Denmark demonstrates that at 
least when status quo is altered such redistributive games are also played at the 
local level. For instance the northern part and the southern part of a new 
municipality fight about ressources and new investments; the center city and the 
periphery of an amalgamated municipality see each other as competitors and all 
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villages compete against each other (simultaneously teaming up against the large 
city). These geographically based redistributive games are complex and the 
complexity is further increased when the local level is added. The many different 
games are exemplified in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2  Examples of geographically based redistributive games at different 
geographic levels
Geographical 
level 
Redistri-
butive game
fought along the
 lines of …
Global National Local
Geographical 
location
Europe
vs. 
Asia
Capital
vs. 
Provinces
Northern part  
vs. 
southern part of the 
municipality
Type of geographical 
entity (inter)  
Advanced economies
vs. 
BRICs
Large cities
vs. 
Small cities
Center city
vs. 
Local periphery
Type of geographical 
entity (intra)
Denmark
vs. 
Japan
Towns
vs. 
Towns
Village
vs. 
Village
These redistributive games are most often seen as zero-sum games – if China 
has huge growth rates, the U.S. suffers; if the capital of Copenhagen attracts new 
companies and citizens, fewer people will live in some of the peripheral cities, and 
if the school, the nursing home and the local government administration building 
are closed down in one village, the neighbouring village will probably experience 
more activity in its equivalent institutions (and thereby more jobs). These kinds of 
games are often self-perpetuating: If the school is closed in one village, the 
teachers might move to the neighboring village to teach, and then they will also 
buy their groceries there, which would mean that the shops in the first village 
might close, and with no shops, newcomers will not settle there but in the village 
with school and shops etc. It can be a vicious circle. And the other way around 
when a village or town attracts new public jobs, it will tend to grow even more as 
a consequence. It should be emphasized that we do not know how strong these 
self-perpetuating effects are at the local level in Denmark – or if they exist. But 
quite a lot of citizens and local politicians alike believed in them, and they were 
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often included in the debate leading up to the structural reform.
A lot of effort was put into discussing the geographic design of the new 
municipalities in terms of where to locate city hall, schools, nursing homes etc. 
Some of the decisions are path-dependent and cannot be changed overnight; 
others were left for the newly elected councilors in the amalgamated 
municipalities. Some municipalities chose a concentrated model where most of the 
activities are concentrated in the larger of the cities. Others chose a more 
deconcentrated model where for instance the municipal administration is 
distributed among several cities in the new municipalities (often by using the 
existing city halls of the old municipalities). Many municipalities probably have 
not yet found the final solution, but may have used a more deconcentrated model 
in the first years of the new municipality’s life with more concentration coming 
up. The delay of the concentration might have been chosen for political reasons 
(too fast a concentration might have caused too much popular protest) or for 
practical reasons (it takes time to sell existing buildings and build new ones). We 
do not know yet how the redistribution game will end in each of the 
municipalities (see Bhatti et al., 2010), but the discussion of the municipal 
structure and the decision to amalgamate the Danish municipalities definitely 
unleashed an intense discussion about how to geographically design the new 
municipalities. The Danish case has demonstrated that geography matters at the 
local political level and has to be taken into account in the discussion of reforming 
local welfare states.
4.  CONCLUSION – THE GEOGRAPHICAL PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALIZATION
The Danish case demonstrates that the traditional weighting of efficiency 
and democracy remains at the core in discussions about municipal size. However, 
while the efficiency argument is normally based on economies of scale and the 
democracy argument on the participation dimension, other dimensions of the two 
classic arguments took the lead in the Danish debate. The main efficiency 
argument for amalgamating municipalities was professional sustainability – by 
merging the municipal administration of local welfare services it is possible to 
increase the professional quality by exploiting the higher degree of specialization 
and the thicker professional milieu. The main democracy argument against 
amalgamating municipalities was the fear of increasing the distance between 
politicians and citizens, which not least for the more peripheral areas could mean 
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that they would be forgotten (less local community advocacy) in the redistributive 
game about the location of for instance the local administration and local welfare 
state institutions like schools and nursing homes.
The Danish case and the identified arguments also point to the fact that 
geography matters when we discuss reforms of local welfare states. This reflects 
the current geographical fights over wealth and growth at the global as well as at 
the national level. These geographically defined tensions in the political debate at 
the very local level have been sparked or at least magnified by the shock to the 
system which an amalgamation reform also forms. And the controversies seem to 
continue – even though we are now six years into the new municipal structure the 
old borders between the municipalities have not been forgotten. The global 
financial crisis and the economic problems it has created also for the public sector 
in many countries has intensified the fight over scarce economic resources. It is 
still too early to evaluate the reform (the central government is conducting a first 
prelimenary evaluation of selected issues) and we do not know what the final 
design of the new local welfare state will look like. We know the new municipal 
borders but we do not know how each of the new municipalities in the long run 
will arrange themselves in more detail, and therefore we do not know the long-
term consequences in terms of professional sustainability and local community 
advocacy. But we can guess why it is so difficult for the local councilors to settle 
on these more detailed decisions – the new municipalities come with a built-in 
geographical paradox. To acquire the higher degree of professional sustainability 
for which the amalgamations have paved the way, the councilors have to 
concentrate the service-providing institutions and not least the local 
administration to the extent possible in the center city of the new municipality. 
However, the activities and the jobs linked to local welfare state service provision 
are so important for the more general patterns of economic growth in the different 
localities of an amalgamated municipality, and there will also in the democratic 
political process be advocates of a more deconcentrated solution where the 
municipal administration and institutions are more equally distributed among 
cities and villages.
One might think that since a reform was decided and implemented, 
amalgamating municipalities on the basis of the professional sustainability 
argument, there would be a preference for concentrating most of the municipal 
activities in the center city. However, the severe consequences for the general 
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economic well-being of the smaller cities and villages if the local welfare state is 
geographically concentrated (despite the potential increase in professional 
sustainability, which would benefit citizens from all geographical areas in the new 
municipality) have made some councilors hesitate. One lesson is that professional 
sustainability is a theoretical argument behind municipal amalgamations, but 
changing the municipal structure is not sufficient to obtain it. The professional 
milieus in the local administration would also have to be merged and that has not 
(yet) happened everywhere (see Bhatti et al., 2010).
But why are the councillors so hesitant? We do not know for sure, but one 
hypothesis is that they do not facilitate administrative professionalization 
because they are amateurs. In a Weberian sense councilors who do not live off 
politics are political amateurs (Weber, 1919) and Danish councilors serve on the 
board in their spare time on top of their paid work. The motivation for many 
councilors to go into local politics is not to be a local civil servant, but rather to 
take up for instance local community advocacy and perform geographical 
representation in favor of the specific locality where they live. So implementing a 
reform which aims at administrative profesionalization is no easy task in a 
system built on political amateurism. The Danish case demonstrates that 
reforming the local welfare state by amalgamating municipalities is a 
multifacetted business.
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